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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Public school students’ free speech rights have long de-
pended on a vital distinction:  We “defer to the school[]” when 
its “arm of authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse 
gate,” but when it reaches beyond that gate, it “must answer to 
the same constitutional commands that bind all other institu-
tions of government.”  Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 
1044–45 (2d Cir. 1979).  The digital revolution, however, has 
complicated that distinction.  With new forms of communica-
tion have come new frontiers of regulation, where educators 
assert the power to regulate online student speech made off 
school grounds, after school hours, and without school re-
sources. 
This appeal takes us to one such frontier.  Appellee B.L. 
failed to make her high school’s varsity cheerleading team and, 
over a weekend and away from school, posted a picture of her-
self with the caption “fuck cheer” to Snapchat.  J.A. 484.  She 
was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year and sued 
her school in federal court.  The District Court granted sum-
mary judgment in B.L.’s favor, ruling that the school had vio-
lated her First Amendment rights.  We agree and therefore will 
affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
B.L. is a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS).  
As a rising freshman, she tried out for cheerleading and made 
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junior varsity.  The next year, she was again placed on JV.  To 
add insult to injury, an incoming freshman made the varsity 
team. 
B.L. was frustrated:  She had not advanced in cheerleading, 
was unhappy with her position on a private softball team, and 
was anxious about upcoming exams.  So one Saturday, while 
hanging out with a friend at a local store, she decided to vent 
those frustrations.  She took a photo of herself and her friend 
with their middle fingers raised and posted it to her Snapchat 
story.1  The snap was visible to about 250 “friends,” many of 
whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheer-
leaders, and it was accompanied by a puerile caption:  “Fuck 
school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.”  J.A. 484.  To 
that post, B.L. added a second:  “Love how me and [another 
student] get told we need a year of jv before we make varsity 
but that’s [sic] doesn’t matter to anyone else?  .”2  J.A. 485. 
One of B.L.’s teammates took a screenshot of her first snap 
and sent it to one of MAHS’s two cheerleading coaches.  That 
coach brought the screenshot to the attention of her co-coach, 
 
1 “Snapchat is a social media application for smartphones 
that allows users to send private text, photo, and video mes-
sages to other users.”  J.A. 6.  Snaps can be viewed only tem-
porarily and “cannot be accessed from the web.”  Id.  
2 The “upside-down smiley face” emoji “indicate[s] silliness, 
sarcasm, irony, passive aggression, or frustrated resignation.”  
Upside-Down Face Emoji, Dictionary.com, https://www.dic-
tionary.com/e/emoji/upside-down-face-emoji (last visited  
June 25, 2020). 
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who, it turned out, was already in the know:  “Several students, 
both cheerleaders and non-cheerleaders,” had approached her, 
“visibly upset,” to “express their concerns that [B.L.’s] [s]naps 
were inappropriate.”  J.A. 7 (citations omitted).   
The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school 
rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, 
requiring cheerleaders to “have respect for [their] school, 
coaches, . . . [and] other cheerleaders”; avoid “foul language 
and inappropriate gestures”; and refrain from sharing “negative 
information regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or  
coaches . . . on the internet.”  J.A. 439.  They also felt B.L.’s 
snap violated a school rule requiring student athletes to “con-
duct[] themselves in such a way that the image of the Mahanoy 
School District would not be tarnished in any manner.”   
J.A. 486.  So the coaches removed B.L. from the JV team.  B.L. 
and her parents appealed that decision to the athletic director, 
school principal, district superintendent, and school board.  But 
to no avail:  Although school authorities agreed B.L. could try 
out for the team again the next year, they upheld the coaches’ 
decision for that year.  Thus was born this lawsuit. 
B.L. sued the Mahanoy Area School District (School Dis-
trict or District) in the United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Pennsylvania.  She advanced three claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983: that her suspension from the team violated 
the First Amendment; that the school and team rules she was 
said to have broken are overbroad and viewpoint discrimina-
tory; and that those rules are unconstitutionally vague.   
The District Court granted summary judgment in B.L.’s fa-
vor.  It first ruled that B.L. had not waived her speech rights by 
agreeing to the team’s rules and that her suspension from the 
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team implicated the First Amendment even though extracurric-
ular participation is merely a privilege.  Turning to the merits, 
the Court ruled that B.L.’s snap was off-campus speech and 
thus not subject to regulation under Bethel School District  
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).  And, finding that 
B.L.’s snap had not caused any actual or foreseeable substan-
tial disruption of the school environment, the Court ruled her 
snap was also not subject to discipline under Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 
(1969).  The Court therefore concluded that the School District 
had violated B.L.’s First Amendment rights, rendering unnec-
essary any consideration of her overbreadth, viewpoint dis-
crimination, or vagueness claims.  It entered judgment in 
B.L.’s favor, awarding nominal damages and requiring the 
school to expunge her disciplinary record.  This appeal fol-
lowed. 
II.  DISCUSSION3 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. I.  Over time, those deceptively simple words have 
spun off a complex doctrinal web.  The briefs here are a testa-
ment to that complexity, citing a wealth of cases involving not 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
§§ 1331 and 1343(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and 
apply the same standard as the district court.  J.S. ex rel.  
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc). 
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only student speech but also public employee speech, obscen-
ity, indecency, and many other doctrines. 
At its heart, though, this appeal requires that we answer just 
two questions.  The first is whether B.L.’s snap was protected 
speech.  If it was not, our inquiry is at an end.  But if it was, we 
must then decide whether B.L. validly waived that protection.  
Although navigating those questions requires some stopovers 
along the way, we ultimately conclude that B.L.’s snap was 
protected and that she did not waive her right to post it. 
A. B.L.’s Speech Was Entitled to First  
Amendment Protection 
We must first determine what, if any, protection the First 
Amendment affords B.L.’s snap.  To do so, we begin by can-
vassing the Supreme Court’s student speech cases.  Next, we 
turn to a threshold question on which B.L.’s rights depend: 
whether her speech took place “on” or “off” campus.  Finally, 
having found that B.L.’s snap was off-campus speech, we as-
sess the School District’s arguments that it was entitled to pun-
ish B.L. for that speech under Fraser, Tinker, and several other 
First Amendment doctrines. 
1. Students’ broad free speech rights and the  
on- versus off-campus distinction 
For over three-quarters of a century, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that although schools perform “important, delicate, 
and highly discretionary functions,” there are “none that they 
may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.”  W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).  
And the free speech rights of minors are subject to “scrupulous 
protection,” lest we “strangle the free mind at its source and 
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teach youth to discount important principles of our government 
as mere platitudes.”  Id.   
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court reiterated that students 
do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”  Id. at 506.  Expanding on 
Barnette, Tinker also held that student speech rights are “not 
confined to the supervised and ordained discussion” of the 
classroom;  instead, they extend to all aspects of “the process 
of attending school,” whether “in the cafeteria, or on the play-
ing field, or on the campus during authorized hours.”  Id. at 
512–13.  Without “a specific showing of constitutionally valid 
reasons to regulate their speech,” then, “students are entitled to 
freedom of expression,” id. at 511, and cannot be punished for 
“expressions of feelings with which [school officials] do not 
wish to contend,” id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 
749 (5th Cir. 1966)).   
To these broad rights, Tinker added a narrow exception “in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”  
393 U.S. at 506.  Some forms of speech, the Court recognized, 
can “interfere[] . . . with the rights of other students to be secure 
and to be let alone.”  Id. at 508.  So as part of their obligation 
“to prescribe and control conduct in the schools,” id. at 507, 
school officials may regulate speech that “would ‘materially 
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school,’” id. at 509 (quoting 
Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749).  To exercise that regulatory power, 
however, schools must identify “more than a mere desire to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
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accompany an unpopular viewpoint” and more than “undiffer-
entiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.”  Id. at 508–09. 
Tinker thus struck a balance, reaffirming students’ rights 
but recognizing a limited zone of heightened governmental au-
thority.  But that authority remains the exception, not the rule.  
Where Tinker applies, a school may prohibit student speech 
only by showing “a specific and significant fear of disruption,” 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 
926 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area 
Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001)), and where it does 
not, a school seeking to regulate student speech “must answer 
to the same constitutional commands that bind all other insti-
tutions of government,” Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045.   
In each of three later cases, the Court identified a limited 
area in which schools have leeway to regulate student speech 
without meeting Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.  In 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), 
it held that to “inculcate the habits and manners of civility,” 
schools may “prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms.”  
Id. at 681, 683 (citation omitted).  In Hazelwood School Dis-
trict v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), it held that officials 
may regulate student speech in the context of “school-spon-
sored . . . expressive activities that students, parents, and mem-
bers of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the impri-
matur of the school,” provided “their actions are reasonably re-
lated to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Id. at 271–73.  And 
in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), given educators’ 
“important—indeed, perhaps compelling[—]interest” in “de-
terring drug use by schoolchildren,” id. at 407 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted), the Court held that schools 
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may “restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as 
promoting illegal drug use,” id. at 408.   
Although each of these cases added a wrinkle, none dis-
turbed the basic framework on which Tinker relied.  Fraser 
could not have been disciplined had he “delivered the same 
speech in a public forum outside the school context.”  Morse, 
551 U.S. at 405.  Kuhlmeier’s editorial authority applies “only 
when a student’s school-sponsored speech could reasonably be 
viewed as speech of the school itself,” which “is not lightly to 
be presumed.”  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213–14.  And central to 
Morse was not only the speech’s relationship to the school 
day—that it was made “during school hours” and “at a school-
sanctioned activity,” 551 U.S. at 400–01 (citation omitted)—
but also that juvenile drug use “cause[s] severe and permanent 
damage to the health and well-being of young people,” id. at 
407.   
The Court’s case law therefore reveals that a student’s First 
Amendment rights are subject to narrow limitations when 
speaking in the “school context” but “are coextensive with 
[those] of an adult” outside that context.  J.S., 650 F.3d at 932. 
2. B.L.’s snap was “off-campus” speech 
To define B.L.’s speech rights with precision, therefore, we 
must ask whether her snap was “on-” or “off-campus” 
speech—terms we use with caution, for the schoolyard’s phys-
ical boundaries are not necessarily coextensive with the 
“school context,” J.S., 650 F.3d at 932.  After reviewing the 
line separating on- from off-campus speech, we hold B.L.’s 
speech falls on the off-campus side.   
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It is “well established” that the boundary demarcating 
schools’ heightened authority to regulate student speech “is not 
constructed solely of the bricks and mortar surrounding the 
school yard.”  Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. 
Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  That is the 
only conclusion to be drawn from the fact that the Supreme 
Court, in defining the scope of schools’ authority, has consist-
ently focused not on physical boundaries but on the extent to 
which schools control or sponsor the forum or the speech.  See 
Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270–71; 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, 680.  And that focus makes sense:  Just 
as the school context “is not confined to . . . the classroom,” 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512, neither can it be confined to the 
school’s physical grounds because exclusive dependence on 
“real property lines,” Layshock, 650 F.3d at 221 (Jordan, J., 
concurring), would exclude “part[s] of the process of attending 
school” that occur beyond those lines, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.   
Equally well established, however, is that “the ‘school 
yard’ is not without boundaries and the reach of school author-
ities is not without limits.”  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216.  School 
officials, in other words, may not “reach into a child’s home 
and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can 
control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored 
activities.”  Id.  Permitting such expansive authority would 
twist Tinker’s limited accommodation of the “special charac-
teristics of the school environment,” 393 U.S. at 506, into a 
broad rule reducing the free speech rights of all young people 
who happen to be enrolled in public school.   
The courts’ task, then, is to discern and enforce the line sep-
arating “on-” from “off-campus” speech.  That task has been 
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tricky from the beginning.  See, e.g., Thomas, 607 F.2d at 
1045–47, 1050–52 (declining to apply Tinker to a student pub-
lication because, although a few articles were written and 
stored at school, the publication was largely “conceived, exe-
cuted, and distributed outside the school”).  But the difficulty 
has only increased after the digital revolution.  Students use 
social media and other forms of online communication with 
remarkable frequency.  Sometimes the conversation online is a 
high-minded one, with students “participating in issue- or 
cause-focused groups, encouraging other people to take action 
on issues they care about, and finding information on protests 
or rallies.”  Br. of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation 
et al. 13.  Other times, that conversation is mundane or plain 
silly.  Either way, the “omnipresence” of online communica-
tion poses challenges for school administrators and courts 
alike.  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220–21 (Jordan, J., concurring); 
see J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the on- and 
off-campus divide in the context of online speech, it has laid 
down invaluable road markers that guide our way.  The Court 
first addressed the internet’s “vast democratic forums” in  
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).  Reno recognized 
that the internet poses unique challenges but also offers unique 
advantages, “provid[ing] relatively unlimited, low-cost capac-
ity for communication of all kinds” and content “as diverse as 
human thought,” id. at 870 (citation omitted).  In applying the 
First Amendment to this technology, the Court was careful not 
to discard existing doctrines.  Instead, it applied those doctrines 
faithfully, trusting that even faced with a “new marketplace,” 
“[t]he interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a dem-
ocratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit 
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of censorship.”  Id. at 885.  It took a similar approach in Pack-
ingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), recognizing 
both the “vast potential” and serious risks connected with the 
“revolution of historic proportions” wrought by new commu-
nicative technologies.  Id. at 1736.  As in Reno, in Packingham 
the Court met new technologies with settled precedent, “exer-
cis[ing] extreme caution before suggesting that the First 
Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast net-
works” in “the modern public square.”  Id. at 1736–37. 
The lesson from Reno and Packingham is that faced with 
new technologies, we must carefully adjust and apply—but not 
discard—our existing precedent.  The thrust of that lesson is 
not unique to the First Amendment context.  But it may be of 
special importance there because each new communicative 
technology provides an opportunity for “unprecedented” regu-
lation.  Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.  And even when it is 
unclear whether the government will seize upon such an op-
portunity, the lack of clarity itself has a harmful “chilling effect 
on free speech.”  Reno, 521 U.S. at 872.  Updating the line 
between on- and off-campus speech may be difficult in the so-
cial media age, but it is a task we must undertake.   
Thankfully, significant groundwork has been laid.  In 2011, 
we decided two appeals as a full Court, J.S. and Layshock, both 
of which involved a student’s fake MySpace profile ridiculing 
a school official using crude language.  Although the profiles 
were created away from school, they were not far removed 
from the school environment:  They attacked school officials, 
used photos copied from the schools’ websites, were shared 
with students, caused gossip at school and, in Layshock, were 
viewed on school computers.  J.S., 650 F.3d at 920–23; 
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Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–09.  Even so, in both decisions we 
treated the profiles as “off-campus” speech.  In J.S., we em-
phasized that the speech occurred “outside the school, during 
non-school hours,” and deemed irrelevant that a printout of the 
profile had been brought into the school at the principal’s re-
quest.  650 F.3d at 932–33.  We went further in Layshock, re-
jecting the arguments that the profile was “on-campus” speech 
because the profile was “aimed at the School District Commu-
nity and . . . accessed on campus,” 650 F.3d at 216, and because 
the student had “enter[ed]” the school’s website to copy the 
principal’s photo, id. at 214–16.   
J.S. and Layshock yield the insight that a student’s online 
speech is not rendered “on campus” simply because it involves 
the school, mentions teachers or administrators, is shared with 
or accessible to students, or reaches the school environment.  
That was true in the analog era, see, e.g., Thomas, 607 F.2d at 
1050–52; see also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 
F.3d 608, 611–12, 616–17 (5th Cir. 2004), and it remains true 
in the digital age. 
Applying these principles to B.L.’s case, we easily con-
clude that her snap falls outside the school context.  This is not 
a case in which the relevant speech took place in a “school-
sponsored” forum, Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, or in a context that 
“bear[s] the imprimatur of the school,” Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 
271.  Nor is this a case in which the school owns or operates 
an online platform.  Cf. Oral Arg. Tr. 25 (discussing a “school 
listserv”).  Instead, B.L. created the snap away from campus, 
over the weekend, and without school resources, and she 
shared it on a social media platform unaffiliated with the 
school.  And while the snap mentioned the school and reached 
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MAHS students and officials, J.S. and Layshock hold that those 
few points of contact are not enough.  B.L.’s snap, therefore, 
took place “off campus.”4 
3. The punishment of B.L.’s off-campus speech  
violated the First Amendment 
We next ask whether the First Amendment allowed the 
School District to punish B.L. for her off-campus speech.  The 
District defends its decision under (i) Fraser, (ii) Tinker, and 
 
4 Our concurring colleague asserts that it is “a fundamental 
principle of judicial restraint” that we must avoid analyzing 
constitutional issues beyond those implicated by “the precise 
facts” before us.  Concurr. 1 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. 
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (dis-
cussing the disfavored nature of facial challenges)).  We take 
no issue with that general principle.  Indeed, that principle ex-
plains why, although we had to tease out the on- and off-cam-
pus distinction enough to be confident about how to categorize 
B.L.’s speech, we have refrained from opining about how that 
distinction should be applied in future cases.  We fail to see 
how our choice not to analyze hypothetical questions—for in-
stance, the exact boundaries of “school-supervised channels” 
for “all forms of social media students use that schools moni-
tor,” or which types of speech “constitute[] ‘harassment’ in the 
school and social media context,” id. at 3—shows a lack of ju-
dicial restraint.  Just as in all areas of constitutional law, future 
cases requiring additional analysis will supply the “facts” nec-
essary “to draw . . . clear and administrable line[s].”  Id. 
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(iii) a series of First Amendment doctrines beyond the student 
speech context.  We address each in turn. 
i.  B.L.’s punishment cannot be justified  
under Fraser 
The School District principally defends its actions based on 
its power “to enforce socially acceptable behavior” by banning 
“vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive” speech by stu-
dents.  Appellant’s Br. 7–8.  Under Fraser, such speech re-
ceives “no First Amendment protection . . . in school.”  Saxe, 
240 F.3d at 213 (emphasis added).  But the District’s argument 
runs aground on our precedent holding that Fraser does not 
apply to off-campus speech.  J.S., 650 F.3d at 932–33; 
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216–17, 219.  As a panel, we may not 
revisit that precedent absent “intervening authority,” Reich v. 
D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996), which neither 
party identifies here.  See Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (“Had Fraser 
delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school 
context, it would have been protected.”). 
To prevail under Fraser, therefore, the School District must 
explain why J.S. and Layshock do not supply the decisional 
rule.  Its attempts to do so come in several varieties but share 
the same thrust: that we should apply Fraser to off-campus 
speech where the speech or punishment involved an extracur-
ricular activity.  We are unpersuaded. 
To begin, the argument collides with our precedent.  In 
Layshock, among several other punishments, the student was 
“banned from all extracurricular activities.”  650 F.3d at 210.  
But at no point did we suggest any relevant distinction among 
the punishments he had received.  Quite the opposite:  
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Although we acknowledged the Second Circuit had suggested 
a lesser degree of First Amendment protection for punishments 
related to extracurricular activities, see Doninger ex rel. Don-
inger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2008), in Layshock 
we declined to follow that analysis and even clarified that our 
discussion of Doninger was not a “suggest[ion] that we 
agree[d] with that court’s conclusion,” 650 F.3d at 218.  All 
that mattered to us in Layshock was that the school had “pun-
ish[ed]” the student for his speech, see id. at 214, 216, as B.L. 
was undoubtedly punished for hers.5 
Even apart from Layshock’s guidance, we see no sound rea-
son why we should graft an extracurricular distinction onto our 
case law.  Yes, students have “a reduced expectation of pri-
vacy” under the Fourth Amendment when they participate in 
extracurricular athletics.  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,  
515 U.S. 646, 657, 661–62, 665 (1995).  But the School 
 
5 The District Court assumed without deciding that B.L.’s 
claim fell within the First Amendment retaliation framework, 
which requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) he engaged in con-
stitutionally protected conduct, (2) the defendant engaged in 
retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firm-
ness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal 
link [existed] between the constitutionally protected conduct 
and the retaliatory action.”  Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 
927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The parties here dis-
pute only whether B.L.’s speech was constitutionally pro-
tected.  For the same reasons as the District Court, we conclude 
that we need not decide whether the retaliation framework is 
appropriate in this context. 
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District’s reliance on that line of cases is misplaced.  In the 
Fourth Amendment context, “the ultimate measure of the con-
stitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness,’” a 
standard which “is judged by balancing [the search’s] intrusion 
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its pro-
motion of legitimate governmental interests.”  Id. at 652–53 
(citation omitted).  The First Amendment, however, abhors “ad 
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”  United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010); accord, e.g., 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011).  
That line dividing First from Fourth Amendment doctrine is 
foundational, and we will not blur it here. 
The same goes for the argument that B.L. had no “constitu-
tionally protected property right to participate in extracurricu-
lar activities,” Appellant’s Br. 17.  Be that as it may,6 due pro-
cess case law—which also “depends upon a balancing of the 
individual rights and the governmental interests affected,” 
Main Rd. v. Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080, 1090 (3d Cir. 1975)—is an 
equally poor fit in the First Amendment context.  To prevail on 
a free speech claim, a plaintiff need not show that his interests 
in speaking outweigh the government’s interests in suppress-
ing the speech.  Such a rule would “revise the ‘judgment [of] 
 
6 We have suggested that students have no cognizable prop-
erty interest in extracurricular activities, Angstadt v. Midd-W. 
Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2004), a suggestion ech-
oed by several other circuits, see, e.g., Lowery v. Euverard,  
497 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007); Davenport ex rel. Daven-
port v. Randolph Cty. Bd. of Educ., 730 F.2d 1395, 1397 (11th 
Cir. 1984).  We take no position here on the wisdom or cor-
rectness of that proposition. 
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the American people,’ embodied in the First Amendment, ‘that 
the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the 
costs.’”7  Entm’t Merchants, 564 U.S. at 792 (alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470).   
The School District next offers up an analogy: that students 
who join extracurriculars “represent their schools much in the 
way that government employees represent their employer.”  
Appellant’s Br. 30.  So by going out for the team, it posits, 
students subject their speech rights to coaches’ whims so long 
as their speech does not involve “a matter of public concern.”  
Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).  
This argument, however, depends on dicta from the Sixth Cir-
cuit, which went on to clarify that it was not “grafting a public-
concern requirement onto” student speech doctrine and had in-
voked the Pickering doctrine only to discuss whether “disrup-
tion will occur when a subordinate challenges the authority of 
his or her superior.”  See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 
598 n.5 (6th Cir. 2007).  And neither “the Supreme Court nor 
any other federal court of appeals has held [the personal mat-
ter/public concern] distinction applicable in student speech 
cases.”  Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 766 
(9th Cir. 2006).  The reason is simple:  As we have recognized, 
 
7 Similarly unavailing is the School District’s argument that 
Pennsylvania law permits regulation of students’ “conduct and 
deportment” only when they are “under the supervision of the 
board of school directors and teachers,” see 24 P.S. § 5-510, 
but authorizes regulation of extracurricular activities without 
that limitation, see id. § 5-511.  Whether or not that is true is 
wholly beside the point, as state law cannot excuse a violation 
of the federal constitution.  See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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students’ free speech rights are not limited to matters of public 
concern.  See, e.g., J.S., 650 F.3d at 926 (“Although Tinker 
dealt with political speech, the opinion has never been confined 
to such speech.”); see also Pinard, 467 F.3d at 766 (“[N]either 
Tinker nor its progeny limited students’ rights solely to the ex-
ercise of political speech or speech that touches on a matter of 
public concern.”).   
Above all, we cannot depart from J.S. and Layshock with-
out undermining the values those cases sought to protect.  What 
was “unseemly and dangerous” about the efforts to apply Fra-
ser to off-campus speech was not the punishments the students 
received, but that those punishments were used to “control” 
students’ free expression in an area traditionally beyond regu-
lation.  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216.  Those concerns apply with 
equal force where a school seeks to control student speech us-
ing even modest measures, much less participation in extracur-
ricular activities, which “are an important part of an overall ed-
ucational program,” Br. of Amicus Curiae Foundation for In-
dividual Rights in Education 7–8 (citation omitted).  Thus, 
whatever the school’s preferred mode of discipline, it impli-
cates the First Amendment so long as it comes in response to 
the student’s exercise of free speech rights.   
No one challenges that is exactly what happened to B.L.  As 
a result, we can no more hold that B.L. abdicated her First 
Amendment right to speak as a cheerleader than we could re-
turn to bygone days in which a police officer was thought to 
have a “right to talk politics . . . [but not] to be a policeman.”  
See O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 
712, 716–17 (1996) (quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor, 29 N.E. 517, 
517 (Mass. 1892)).  Instead, we conclude, Fraser did not 
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authorize the School District’s punishment of B.L. for her off-
campus speech. 
ii. Nor can B.L.’s punishment be justified  
under Tinker 
The School District falls back on Tinker, arguing that 
B.L.’s snap was likely to substantially disrupt the cheerleading 
program.  But as we have explained, although B.L.’s snap in-
volved the school and was accessible to MAHS students, it 
took place beyond the “school context,” J.S., 650 F.3d at 932.  
We therefore confront the question whether Tinker applies to 
off-campus speech. 
That is a question we have avoided answering to date.  In 
Layshock, the school defended its decision to punish the stu-
dent only under Fraser.  See 650 F.3d at 216.  And in J.S., we 
were able to “assume, without deciding,” that Tinker applied 
to speech like J.S.’s, 650 F.3d at 926, because we held that the 
school had not “reasonably forecast[] a substantial disruption 
of or material interference with the school,” id. at 931.  But the 
question is once again squarely before us,8 and for three rea-
sons we conclude we must answer it today. 
 
8 One of the amici supporting B.L. suggests we follow J.S. 
by assuming Tinker applies and holding that her snap did not 
satisfy the substantial disruption standard.  Br. of Amicus Cu-
riae Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 17.  An-
other set of amici on B.L.’s side takes a different view, con-
tending that Tinker’s substantial disruption standard “should 
not apply to off-campus speech.”  Br. of Amici Curiae Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation et al. 4 (capitalization altered).  For 
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First, our choice to sidestep the issue in J.S. adhered to the 
maxim that, where possible, we should avoid difficult consti-
tutional questions in favor of simpler resolutions.  There, it was 
sensible to avoid the issue because we could resolve the case 
by applying well-settled precedent addressing the substantial 
disruption standard in the context of the school environment.  
See, e.g., Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ.,  
307 F.3d 243, 254–57 (3d Cir. 2002); Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211–
12.  But that is not the case here.  The School District’s defense 
of its decision to punish B.L. focuses not on disruption of the 
school environment at large, but on disruption in the extracur-
ricular context—specifically, the cheerleading program B.L. 
decried in her snap.  And, as the parties’ and amici’s dueling 
citations reveal, the question of how to measure the potentially 
disruptive effect of student speech on particular extracurricular 
activities has bedeviled our sister circuits,9 and it is not one we 
 
her part, B.L. takes a middle path:  She argues that “[f]un-
damental First Amendment principles plainly forbid giving 
schools the power to censor student speech outside of school,” 
Appellee’s Br. 12, but as the appellee, she unsurprisingly adds 
we “need not answer that question in this case” because “even 
if it were clear that schools may punish offensive, off-campus 
speech under Tinker (which it is not),” the substantial disrup-
tion standard was not met here, id. at 12, 22.  And on the other 
side of the “v.,” both the School District and the amici that sup-
port it argue that Tinker applies to off-campus speech like 
B.L.’s.  See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 23 & n.1, 41; Br. of Amici 
Curiae National School Boards Association et al. 18–23. 
9 Compare, e.g., Pinard, 467 F.3d at 760–61, 768–69 (hold-
ing that students’ distribution of a petition seeking their 
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have addressed to date.  So were we to leapfrog Tinker’s ap-
plicability in favor of substantial disruption analysis, we would 
still face complex and unresolved constitutional questions.10  
 
coach’s resignation did not give rise to a reasonable forecast of 
substantial disruption, in part because the students had reported 
the coach’s misbehavior in a “responsibly tailored” way (cita-
tion omitted)), with, e.g., id. at 769–70 (holding that the ath-
letes’ refusal to board a bus before a game “substantially dis-
rupted and materially interfered with a school activity”), Low-
ery, 497 F.3d at 593–94 (holding that a similar petition request-
ing a coach’s termination qualifies as substantially disruptive 
because of its effect on “team morale and unity”), and Wildman 
ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 
769–72 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a student athlete’s letter 
calling for teammates to criticize their coach disturbed the goal 
of providing “an educational environment conducive to learn-
ing team unity and sportsmanship and free from disruptions 
and distractions that could hurt or stray the cohesiveness of the 
team”). 
10 Our concurring colleague argues that this case is 
“straightforward” under Tinker’s substantial disruption stand-
ard, Concurr. 3, because school authorities conceded there was 
“no reason to believe that the Snap would disrupt classroom or 
school activities,” e.g., Appellee’s Br. 8.  But that is not the 
School District’s argument.  Rather, the District contends that 
B.L.’s snap was disruptive because it undercut the “team mo-
rale” and “chemistry” on which the cheerleading program de-
pends and because, in the unique context of extracurricular ac-
tivities, this is enough to satisfy Tinker.  Appellant’s Br. 41.  
That contention finds some grounding in opinions from other 
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Second, when we decided J.S., the social media revolution 
was still in its infancy, and few appellate courts had grappled 
with Tinker’s application to off-campus online speech.  In 
avoiding the issue, we afforded our sister circuits the chance to 
 
Courts of Appeals holding that because school athletics pro-
grams rely heavily on “team unity,” “cohesiveness,” and 
“sportsmanship,” Wildman, 249 F.3d at 771, and advance a 
“narrower” set of goals than does the education system as a 
whole, Lowery, 497 F.3d at 589, student speech that under-
mines those values satisfies Tinker’s substantial disruption 
standard.  See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 593–94; Wildman, 249 F.3d 
at 769–72.  But see Pinard, 467 F.3d at 768–69.  Here, B.L. 
does not dispute that her speech would undermine team morale 
and chemistry:  She openly criticized the program and ques-
tioned her coaches’ decisionmaking, causing a number of 
teammates and fellow students to be “visibly upset” and to ap-
proach the coaches with their “concerns,” J.A. 7 (citations 
omitted).  She did so, moreover, in the context of a sport in 
which team members rely on each other for not only emotional 
and moral support, but also physical safety.  In this context, we 
cannot so comfortably conclude that assuming Tinker’s ap-
plicability and analyzing substantial disruption would yield a 
ready answer or a rule we could cogently explain for the benefit 
of future cases.  And while our colleague makes some refer-
ence to these issues in a footnote, we do not think they can be 
swept aside under the umbrella “that courts may consider all 
the ways in which student speech may be disruptive,” Con-
curr. 4 n.1.  At bottom, we think it unwise to explore these un-
resolved questions without assessing the threshold question 
whether Tinker applies to B.L.’s speech in the first place. 
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coalesce around an approach and the Supreme Court the 
chance to resolve the issue.  Nearly a decade later, however, 
we see not only that social media has continued its expansion 
into every corner of modern life, but also that no dominant ap-
proach has developed.  All the while, we have relegated district 
courts in this Circuit to confronting this issue without clear 
guidance, prompting them to turn elsewhere for support, see, 
e.g., Dunkley v. Bd. of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 3d 485, 492–94 
(D.N.J. 2016), and to voice their growing frustration.  As one 
of our district judges put it, “a district court in this Circuit takes 
up a student off-campus speech case for review with consider-
able apprehension and anxiety.”  R.L. ex rel. Lordan v. Cent. 
York Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 635 (M.D. Pa. 2016).  
Finally, while legal uncertainty of any kind is undesirable, 
uncertainty in this context creates unique problems.  Obscure 
lines between permissible and impermissible speech have an 
independent chilling effect on speech.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (reasoning that 
the “uncertain reach” of a law punishing speech would “chill 
speech within the First Amendment’s vast and privileged 
sphere”).  And because local officials are liable for constitu-
tional violations only where “every reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing is unlawful,” Russell v. Rich-
ardson, 905 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted), the unresolved issue of Tinker’s 
scope has left a significant obstacle in the path of any student 
seeking to vindicate her free speech rights through a § 1983 
suit.  See, e.g., Longoria ex rel. M.L. v. San Benito Indep. Con-
sol. Sch. Dist., 942 F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that 
because the court had “declin[ed] to adopt a ‘specific rule,’” its 
case law applying Tinker to off-campus speech “does not 
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constitute clearly-established binding law that should have 
placed the defendants on notice about the constitutionality of 
their actions”).   
The time has come for us to answer the question.  We begin 
by canvassing the decisions of our sister circuits.  We then con-
sider the wisdom of their various approaches, tested against 
Tinker’s precepts.  Finally, we adopt and explain our own, con-
cluding that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech and 
reserving for another day the First Amendment implications of 
off-campus student speech that threatens violence or harasses 
others. 
a.  Other courts’ approaches   
Our sister circuits have approached this issue in three ways.  
One group applies Tinker where it was reasonably foreseeable 
that a student’s off-campus speech would reach the school en-
vironment.  That test sprung from trying circumstances:  In 
Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494 F.3d 
34 (2d Cir. 2007), a student created an instant messaging icon 
showing “a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above 
which were dots representing splattered blood,” and beneath 
which were the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” the student’s 
teacher.  Id. at 35–36.  That icon was visible to the student’s 
“buddies,” and he sent messages displaying it to fellow stu-
dents.  Id. at 36.  In upholding his suspension, the Second Cir-
cuit held that it was appropriate to apply Tinker because “it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon would come to the at-
tention of school authorities,” id. at 39, and that the violence-
threatening speech satisfied Tinker’s substantial disruption 
standard, id. at 38–39.  The Eighth Circuit, in another case in-
volving a threat of violence, took the same approach.  See 
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D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 
F.3d 754, 757–59, 765–67 (8th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing that 
“student creativity and . . . ability . . . can[not] flourish if vio-
lence threatens the school environment”).  
But from those cases involving threats of violence, the “rea-
sonable foreseeability” standard spread far and wide.  Multiple 
circuits have applied it in cases involving sexual or racial har-
assment.  See C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J,  
835 F.3d 1142, 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016); S.J.W. ex rel. Wil-
son v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773, 777–78 
(8th Cir. 2012).  And the Second Circuit has applied it in a case 
involving neither violence nor harassment:  In Doninger, the 
court used it to assess the punishment of a student who urged 
others to contact a school official to protest a concert’s post-
ponement.  527 F.3d at 44–45, 48–52.  The Eighth Circuit has 
likewise suggested that the standard governs all forms of off-
campus speech, not just violent threats and harassment.  S.J.W., 
696 F.3d at 777. 
Another group of circuits applies Tinker to off-campus 
speech with a sufficient “nexus” to the school’s “pedagogical 
interests.”  Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 
(4th Cir. 2011).  Kowalski involved a student who created a 
MySpace page harassing a fellow student.  Id. at 567–68.  In 
assessing the student’s suspension, the Fourth Circuit empha-
sized that student-on-student harassment “can cause victims to 
become depressed and anxious, to be afraid to go to school, and 
to have thoughts of suicide.”  Id. at 572 (citation omitted).  
Concluding that schools “must be able to prevent and punish 
harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe school en-
vironment,” id., the court held that the speech bore a “sufficient 
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nexus with the school” justifying Tinker’s application, id. at 
577.  The Ninth Circuit has also applied the nexus test in a case 
involving off-campus sexual harassment.  C.R., 835 F.3d at 
1150–51. 
Finally, some circuits have applied Tinker to off-campus 
speech without articulating a governing test or standard.  See, 
e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (declining to “adopt a specific rule” but 
applying Tinker to a student who “intentionally direct[ed] at 
the school community [a] rap recording containing threats to, 
and harassment and intimidation of, two teachers”); Wynar v. 
Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(declining to “divine and impose a global standard for . . . off-
campus speech” but holding that Tinker reaches off-campus 
speech presenting “an identifiable threat of school violence”).   
b.  Issues with these approaches 
We sympathize with our sister circuits, which have faced 
the unenviable task of assessing students’ free speech rights 
against the backdrop of “school officials’ need to provide a safe 
school environment,” LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 
981, 983 (9th Cir. 2001), and find much to commend in their 
thoughtful opinions.  Ultimately, however, we find their ap-
proaches unsatisfying in three respects.  
First, “bad facts make bad law,” United States v. Joseph, 
730 F.3d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 2013), and one unmistakable trend 
from the case law is that the most challenging fact patterns 
have produced rules untethered from the contexts in which they 
arose.  The Second Circuit provides a case in point.  It is un-
derstandable that the court in Wisniewski, focusing on the 
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threat of violence bound up in the student’s speech, upheld the 
school’s authority to discipline him.  See 494 F.3d at 39–40.  
As other courts have recognized, “we live in a time when 
school violence is an unfortunate reality that educators must 
confront on an all too frequent basis,” LaVine, 257 F.3d at 987, 
and in doing so, they “must be vigilant” and “react to potential 
threats before violence erupts,” Bell, 799 F.3d at 393.  But in 
Doninger, the Second Circuit reflexively applied Wisniewski’s 
reasonable foreseeability test to a fact pattern of a very differ-
ent sort: a student’s protest of a school’s decision to postpone 
an event.  What began as a narrow accommodation of unusu-
ally strong interests on the school’s side, cf. Wynar, 728 F.3d 
at 1069 (distinguishing “an identifiable threat of school vio-
lence” from “myriad” other fact patterns), became a broad rule 
governing all off-campus expression.  A similar dynamic took 
place with the “nexus” test, in that specialized concerns related 
to “harassment and bullying in the school environment,” Kow-
alski, 652 F.3d at 572, produced a rule making off-campus free 
speech rights depend on the speech’s connection to a school’s 
“pedagogical interests,” id. at 573.   
Second, and as a result of this expansionary dynamic, our 
sister circuits have adopted tests that sweep far too much 
speech into the realm of schools’ authority.  Start with reason-
able foreseeability.  Technology has brought unprecedented in-
terconnectivity and access to diverse forms of speech.  In the 
past, it was merely a possibility, and often a remote one, that 
the speech of a student who expressed herself in the public 
square would “reach” the school.  But today, when a student 
speaks in the “modern public square” of the internet, Packing-
ham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737, it is highly possible that her speech 
will be viewed by fellow students and accessible from school.  
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And in some situations, it is a virtual certainty:  Depending on 
the settings favored by that student’s “friends” or “followers,” 
her message may automatically pop up on the face of class-
mates’ phones in the form of notifications from Instagram, Fa-
cebook, Twitter, Snapchat, or any number of other social plat-
forms.  Implicit in the reasonable foreseeability test, therefore, 
is the assumption that the internet and social media have ex-
panded Tinker’s schoolhouse gate to encompass the public 
square.  That assumption is not one we can accept, though, be-
cause it subverts the longstanding principle that heightened au-
thority over student speech is the exception rather than the rule.  
And it contradicts the Supreme Court’s instruction, in cases 
like Packingham and Reno, to apply legal precedent faithfully 
even when confronted with new technologies.11 
 
11 By way of example, imagine a student who, off campus 
and over the weekend, writes a blog post identifying every 
teacher he thinks is incompetent.  Imagine that he then shares 
the post on a social media platform where it is visible to many 
fellow students.  It is a near certainty that the post will “reach 
campus,” Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48:  Students are likely to chat 
about it in the lunchroom, view it surreptitiously in class, or 
even share it with school officials.  But that type of downstream 
“reach[ing]” the “campus,” id., is “different in kind” from a 
student’s choice to “stand[] up during a lecture” and share sim-
ilar thoughts about the teacher’s incompetence.  See Lee Gold-
man, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehen-
sive Approach, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 395, 407 n.92 (2011) (citation 
omitted).  If it is to remain a limited carveout from students’ 
general “free speech rights,” see J.S., 650 F.3d at 932, Tinker 
must apply only to the latter.  See also id. at 939 (Smith, J., 
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The nexus test suffers from similar overbreadth.  In holding 
that schools have regulatory authority over any speech, 
whether on or off campus, that “interfere[s] with the work and 
discipline of the school,” Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574, it col-
lapses Tinker’s scope of application and rule into one analytical 
step.  The result is tautological:  Schools can regulate off-cam-
pus speech under Tinker when the speech would satisfy Tinker.  
And the effect is to erase the dividing line between speech in 
“the school context” and beyond it, J.S., 650 F.3d at 927, a line 
which is vital to young people’s free speech rights.  Worse, in 
extending Tinker wherever there is a “nexus” to “pedagogical 
interests,” Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573, the test raises the specter 
of officials’ asserting the power to regulate “any student speech 
that interferes with [the] school’s educational mission,” a 
power that “can easily be manipulated in dangerous ways.”  
J.S., 650 F.3d at 927 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring)).  Such an 
expansion of schools’ regulatory power would have “ominous 
implications” indeed.  J.S., 650 F.3d at 939–40 (Smith, J., con-
curring) (exploring the consequences not only for students, but 
also for adults, of extending Tinker to off-campus speech). 
Third, other circuits’ approaches have failed to provide 
clarity and predictability.  This is true for those that have “de-
clined to adopt a rule,” e.g., Bell, 799 F.3d at 394, leaving “stu-
dents, teachers, and school administrators” without “clear 
guidance,” Longoria, 942 F.3d at 265 (citation omitted).  But 
it is also true for those that have crafted a rule.  In layering a 
 
concurring) (discussing the hypothetical of a student who 
writes an off-campus blog post taking a position that causes 
fellow students to react on campus). 
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foreseeability requirement on top of Tinker, the Second and 
Eighth Circuits have made it difficult for students speaking off 
campus to predict when they enjoy full or limited free speech 
rights.  After all, a student can control how and where she 
speaks but exercises little to no control over how her speech 
may “come to the attention of the school authorities,” D.J.M., 
647 F.3d at 766 (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39).  The 
nexus test, too, affords little clarity, leaving students to wonder 
what types of speech might implicate a school’s “pedagogical 
interests,” Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.  And in the First Amend-
ment context, courts must pursue ex ante clarity not for clar-
ity’s own sake, but to avoid chilling potential speech and to 
give government officials notice of the constitutional bounda-
ries they may not cross. 
In the end, although the courts to address this issue have 
done so thoughtfully, we conclude that their approaches sweep 
in too much speech and distort Tinker’s narrow exception into 
a vast font of regulatory authority.  We must forge our own 
path. 
c.  Our approach 
We hold today that Tinker does not apply to off-campus 
speech—that is, speech that is outside school-owned, -oper-
ated, or -supervised channels and that is not reasonably inter-
preted as bearing the school’s imprimatur.  In so holding, we 
build on a solid foundation, for in his concurrence in J.S., now-
Chief Judge Smith, joined by four colleagues, embraced this 
rule, explaining “that the First Amendment protects students 
engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects 
speech by citizens in the community at large.”  650 F.3d at 936.  
That rule is true to the spirit of Tinker, respects students’ rights, 
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and provides much-needed clarity to students and officials 
alike. 
From the outset, Tinker has been a narrow accommodation:  
Student speech within the school context that would “materi-
ally and substantially interfere[] with the requirements of ap-
propriate discipline,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505 (citation omit-
ted), is stripped of the constitutional shield it enjoys “outside 
[that] context,” Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.  Tinker’s focus on dis-
ruption makes sense when a student stands in the school con-
text, amid the “captive audience” of his peers.  Fraser, 478 
U.S. at 684.  But it makes little sense where the student stands 
outside that context, given that any effect on the school envi-
ronment will depend on others’ choices and reactions. 
Recent technological changes reinforce, not weaken, this 
conclusion.  Like all who have approached these issues, we are 
“mindful of the challenges school administrators face,” includ-
ing the need to manage the school environment in the digital 
age.  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 222 (Jordan, J., concurring).  We 
are equally mindful, however, that new communicative tech-
nologies open new territories where regulators might seek to 
suppress speech they consider inappropriate, uncouth, or pro-
vocative.  And we cannot permit such efforts, no matter how 
well intentioned, without sacrificing precious freedoms that the 
First Amendment protects.  The consensus in the analog era 
was that controversial off-campus speech was not subject to 
school regulation, see, e.g., Porter, 393 F.3d at 611–12, 615–
16; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050–52, and Reno and Packingham 
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require that we adhere to that principle even as the speech 
moves online.12 
Holding Tinker inapplicable to off-campus speech also of-
fers the distinct advantage of offering up-front clarity to stu-
dents and school officials.  To enjoy the free speech rights to 
which they are entitled, students must be able to determine 
when they are subject to schools’ authority and when not.  A 
test based on the likelihood that speech will reach the school 
environment—even leaving aside doubts about what it means 
to “reach” the “school environment”—fails to provide that 
clarity.  The same is true for a test dependent on whether the 
student’s speech has a sufficient “nexus” to unspecified peda-
gogical interests or would substantially disrupt the school 
 
12 Several circuits have applied Tinker to speech that the 
speaker brought into the campus environment.  See, e.g.,  
Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 980–85 (11th Cir. 
2007) (upholding a suspension of a student who, in class, 
showed another student a violent story she had written at 
home); Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 822, 827–29 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (applying Tinker to a student newspaper written out-
side school but distributed “in bathrooms, in lockers and in the 
cafeteria”).  Our holding tracks those cases because they do not 
involve “off-campus” speech at all.  A student who brings a 
printed story into campus and shows it to fellow students has 
expressed herself inside the school context regardless whether 
she wrote the story at home or in class.  So too with a student 
who opens his cellphone and shows a classmate a Facebook 
post from the night before. 
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environment.13  But a test based on whether the speech occurs 
in a context owned, controlled, or sponsored by the school is 
much more easily applied and understood.  That clarity bene-
fits students, who can better understand their rights, but it also 
benefits school administrators, who can better understand the 
limits of their authority and channel their regulatory energies 
in productive but lawful ways.   
Nothing in this opinion questions school officials’ “com-
prehensive authority” to regulate students when they act or 
speak within the school environment.  J.S., 650 F.3d at 925 
(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507).  Tinker applies, as it always 
has, to any student who, on campus, shares or reacts to contro-
versial off-campus speech in a disruptive manner.  That author-
ity is not insignificant, and it goes a long way toward address-
ing the concern, voiced by the School District and our concur-
ring colleague, that holding Tinker is limited to on-campus 
speech will “sow . . . confusion” about what to do when a stu-
dent’s controversial off-campus speech “provoke[s] significant 
disruptions within the school,” Concurr. 6.  The answer is 
straightforward:  The school can punish any disruptive speech 
or expressive conduct within the school context that meets 
Tinker’s standards—no matter how that disruption was “pro-
voke[d].”  It is the off-campus statement itself that is not sub-
ject to Tinker’s narrow recognition of school authority.  But at 
least in the physical world, that is nothing new, and no one, 
including our colleague, has second-guessed that longstanding 
 
13 Our divided precedent shows it is often not easy to pre-
dict whether speech will satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption 
standard.  Compare, e.g., J.S., 650 F.3d at 928–31, with, e.g., 
id. at 943–50 (Fisher, J., dissenting).  
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principle or suggested that a student who advocated a contro-
versial position on a placard in a public park one Saturday 
would be subject to school discipline.  We simply hold today 
that the “online” nature of that off-campus speech makes no 
constitutional difference.  See supra pages 11–16. 
Nor are we confronted here with off-campus student speech 
threatening violence or harassing particular students or teach-
ers.  A future case in the line of Wisniewski, D.J.M., Kowalski, 
or S.J.W., involving speech that is reasonably understood as a 
threat of violence or harassment targeted at specific students or 
teachers, would no doubt raise different concerns and require 
consideration of other lines of First Amendment law.  Cf. 
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 209–10, 219 (holding that the student’s 
parody MySpace page was protected speech even though the 
school had deemed it “[h]arassment of a school administra-
tor”); J.S., 650 F.3d at 922, 933 (holding the same even though 
the school’s principal had contacted the police to press harass-
ment charges).  And while we disagree with the Tinker-based 
theoretical approach that many of our sister circuits have taken 
in cases involving students who threaten violence or harass 
others, our opinion takes no position on schools’ bottom-line 
power to discipline speech in that category.  After all, student 
speech falling into one of the well-recognized exceptions to the 
First Amendment is not protected, cf. Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Spe-
cial Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619, 621–27 (8th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc) (upholding a school’s punishment of a student who wrote 
a threatening letter under the “true threat” doctrine); speech 
outside those exceptions may be regulated if the government 
can satisfy the appropriate level of scrutiny, see, e.g., Williams-
Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665–72 (2015); cf. Oral 
Arg. Tr. 28 (exploring whether actions taken to prevent 
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student-on-student harassment could satisfy strict scrutiny); 
and, perhaps most relevant, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that a sufficiently weighty interest on the part of educators can 
justify a narrow exception to students’ broader speech rights, 
see Morse, 551 U.S. at 407–08.  We hold only that off-campus 
speech not implicating that class of interests lies beyond the 
school’s regulatory authority. 
True, our rule leaves some vulgar, crude, or offensive 
speech beyond the power of schools to regulate.  Yet we return 
to Tinker and find in its pages wisdom and comfort: 
[O]ur Constitution says we must take this risk, and our 
history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—
this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national 
strength and of the independence and vigor of Ameri-
cans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, 
often disputatious, society. 
393 U.S. at 508–09 (internal citation omitted); see Barnette, 
319 U.S. at 641 (encouraging courts to “apply the limitations 
of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectu-
ally and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate 
the social organization”).   
Tinker’s careful delineation of schools’ authority, like these 
principles, is no less vital even in today’s digital age to ensure 
“adequate breathing room for valuable, robust speech.”  J.S., 
650 F.3d at 941 (Smith, J., concurring).  For these reasons, we 
hold that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech and thus 
cannot justify the decision to punish B.L. 
 39 
 
 
 
 
 
iii. None of the School District’s remaining  
arguments justifies its punishment of B.L. 
Moving beyond student speech,14 the School District ad-
vances a few arguments for why B.L.’s snap enjoyed no First 
Amendment protection at all.  Each is unsuccessful. 
First, the School District contends that “vulgar language 
[i]s ‘low-value speech’ that c[an] be restricted ‘to a greater ex-
tent than would otherwise be permissible.’”  Appellant’s Br. 35 
(quoting C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 
2000) (Alito, J., dissenting)).  But in doing, the District relies 
on a dissenting opinion, and in any event its selective quotation 
omits the prepositional phrase “[i]n the public schools” and our 
citation of Fraser, see C.H., 226 F.3d at 211 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing), both of which make clear we were not making a broad 
statement that non-obscene profanity enjoys reduced First 
Amendment protection.  Had we made such a statement, it 
would have defied decades of settled law.  See, e.g., Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). 
Second, the School District argues B.L.’s snap was unpro-
tected because it “expressed no opinion.”  Appellant’s Br. 34–
35.  In support, it quotes B.L., who, when asked whether she 
was “trying to send a message,” replied she “was just mad 
 
14 The School District does not suggest it had a right to reg-
ulate B.L.’s snap under Kuhlmeier or Morse.  Nor could it:  No 
reasonable listener could have concluded that B.L.’s snap 
amounted to “speech of the school itself,” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 
213–14, or speech “promoting illegal drug use,” Morse,  
551 U.S. at 403. 
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about everything.”  Id. at 34 (quoting J.A. 65).  This argument 
borders on the frivolous.  The “particular four-letter word” 
B.L. used “is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its 
genre,” but “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,” Cohen, 
403 U.S. at 25, and here, B.L. used it to vent her frustrations 
with the cheerleading program.  There is no doubt B.L.’s snap 
was “imbued with elements of communication,” Troster v. Pa. 
State Dep’t of Corr., 65 F.3d 1086, 1090 (3d Cir. 1995) (cita-
tion omitted), and thus deserving of First Amendment protec-
tion.    
Finally, the School District argues that “profane speech is 
not protected when aimed at minors.”  Appellant’s Reply 2 
(capitalization altered).  Again, the District misses the mark.  
Its argument relies on FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 
726 (1978), a case involving the sui generis context of radio 
broadcasting, which is “uniquely accessible to children,” id. at 
749.  But nowhere did Pacifica suggest that indecent speech 
falls outside the First Amendment.  Moreover, B.L.’s snap was 
no more indecent, or targeted at an “intended audience [of] mi-
nors,” Appellant’s Reply 3, than the MySpace profiles we held 
were entitled to First Amendment protection in J.S. and 
Layshock. 
For these reasons, we hold that B.L.’s snap was not subject 
to regulation under Tinker or Fraser and instead enjoyed the 
full scope of First Amendment protections. 
B. B.L. Did Not Waive Her Free Speech Rights 
The School District next argues that by agreeing to certain 
school and team rules, B.L. waived her First Amendment right 
to post the “fuck cheer” snap.  We disagree.   
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To begin, we note that the District Court ruled that requir-
ing B.L. to waive her First Amendment rights as a condition of 
joining the team violated the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine, see Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,  
570 U.S. 595, 604–06 (2013), and that both B.L. and an amicus 
urge us to affirm that ruling.  No doubt, for the government to 
condition participation in a beneficial program on a waiver of 
First Amendment rights raises serious constitutional concerns, 
particularly where the government “seek[s] to leverage [bene-
fits] to regulate speech outside the contours of the program it-
self.”  Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 
570 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2013); see also, e.g., FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 399–401 (1984).  At the 
same time, however, the line between constitutional and un-
constitutional conditions “is hardly clear,” Agency for Int’l 
Dev., 570 U.S. at 215, and there are a wide range of extracur-
ricular activities and student roles that may make conditions on 
speech more or less connected to the needs of the program.  
Fortunately, we need not decide on which side of the line this 
case falls because we conclude that B.L. did not waive her right 
to the speech at issue here.   
All rights, including free speech rights, can be waived.  
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 142–43 (1967).  But 
waivers “must be voluntary, knowing, . . . intelligent, . . . [and] 
established by ‘clear’ and ‘compelling’ evidence,” Erie Tele-
comms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1094 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(citation omitted), and courts must “indulge in every reasona-
ble presumption against waiver,” id. at 1095 (quoting John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  Applying those 
standards, we conclude that B.L.’s snap does not clearly “fall 
within the scope,” United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d 412, 414 
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(3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted), of any of the rules on which 
the School District relies. 
We begin with the “Respect Rule” governing MAHS cheer-
leaders: 
Please have respect for your school, coaches, teachers, 
other cheerleaders and teams.  Remember, you are rep-
resenting your school when at games, fundraisers, and 
other events.  Good sportsmanship will be enforced[;] 
this includes foul language and inappropriate gestures. 
J.A. 439.  B.L.’s snap contained foul language and disrespected 
her school and team.  But the rule’s language suggests it applies 
only “at games, fundraisers, and other events,” a suggestion 
echoed by its invocation of “[g]ood sportsmanship.”  Id.  That 
would not cover a weekend post to Snapchat unconnected with 
any game or school event and before the cheerleading season 
had even begun.  And common sense supports this reading:  It 
is hard to believe a reasonable student would understand that 
by agreeing to the Respect Rule, she was waiving all rights to 
malign the school once safely off campus and in the world at 
large.  Indeed, one of the cheerleading coaches recognized that 
the rule “doesn’t say anything about not being able to use foul 
language or inappropriate gestures . . . away from school.”   
J.A. 90.  So this rule is of no help to the School District. 
The “Negative Information Rule” is likewise inapplicable.  
It states “[t]here will be no toleration of any negative infor-
mation regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or coaches 
placed on the internet.”  J.A. 439.  Unlike the Respect Rule, 
this rule by its terms reaches off-campus speech.  But it reaches 
only “information,” id., a term denoting matters of fact, see, 
e.g., Information, Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
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(10th ed. 1997) (“the communication or reception of 
knowledge or intelligence”; “knowledge obtained from inves-
tigation, study, or instruction”), not mere expressions of opin-
ion or emotion.  We are hard pressed to find in the words “fuck 
cheer” any discernable negative information about the cheer-
leading program.  And although B.L.’s second snap contains 
information about the varsity team’s acceptance of an incom-
ing freshman, nothing in the record suggests B.L.’s punishment 
was based on that snap or the information it revealed.  So this 
rule, too, provides no basis for a finding of waiver. 
The School District’s last recourse is the “Personal Conduct 
Rule” in MAHS’s student handbook.  It provides: 
Participation on an athletic team or cheerleading squad 
in the Mahanoy Area School District is a privilege and 
the participants must earn the right to represent Maha-
noy Schools by conducting themselves in such a way 
that the image of the Mahanoy School District would 
not be tarnished in any manner.  Any participant whose 
conduct is judged to reflect a discredit upon him-
self/herself, the team, or the Mahanoy Schools, whether 
or not such activity takes place during or outside school 
hours during the sports season, will be subject to disci-
plinary action as determined by the coach, the athletic 
director and/or the school principal. 
J.A. 486.  This rule does not lend itself to a finding of waiver 
for two reasons.  First, it applies only “during the sports sea-
son,” id., but B.L. posted her snap after the previous season had 
ended and before practices for the next season had begun.  Sec-
ond, the rule’s language gives few clear markers, applying 
wherever a student’s behavior would “tarnish[]” the school’s 
“image” in “any manner,” J.A. 486.  That language is too 
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obscure, and too dependent on the whims of school officials, 
to give rise to a knowing and voluntary waiver of B.L.’s rights 
to speak as she did.   
We therefore hold that B.L.’s snap was not covered by any 
of the rules on which the School District relies and reject its 
contention that B.L. waived her First Amendment rights. 
*          *          * 
The heart of the School District’s arguments is that it has a 
duty to “inculcate the habits and manners of civility” in its stu-
dents.  Appellant’s Br. 24 (citation omitted).  To be sure, B.L.’s 
snap was crude, rude, and juvenile, just as we might expect of 
an adolescent.  But the primary responsibility for teaching ci-
vility rests with parents and other members of the community.  
As arms of the state, public schools have an interest in teaching 
civility by example, persuasion, and encouragement, but they 
may not leverage the coercive power with which they have 
been entrusted to do so.  Otherwise, we give school adminis-
trators the power to quash student expression deemed crude or 
offensive—which far too easily metastasizes into the power to 
censor valuable speech and legitimate criticism.  Instead, by 
enforcing the Constitution’s limits and upholding free speech 
rights, we teach a deeper and more enduring version of respect 
for civility and the “hazardous freedom” that is our national 
treasure and “the basis of our national strength.”  Tinker,  
393 U.S. at 508–09. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment  
 I concur in the judgment affirming the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment to B.L. on the narrow ground that 
our holdings in Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), and 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 
915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), mandate that outcome.  I dissent 
from the majority’s holding that, on the facts before us, the 
holding in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)—that schools may 
regulate student speech only if it “substantially disrupt[s] the 
work and discipline of the school,” id. at 513—does not apply 
to “off-campus” speech. 
I dissent because it is a fundamental principle of 
judicial restraint that courts should “neither anticipate a 
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader 
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be 
applied.”  Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936)) (quotation marks 
omitted).  Cf. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) 
(“For adjudication of constitutional issues[,] concrete legal 
issues[] presented in actual cases, not abstractions[,] are 
requisite.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).   
In Tinker the Supreme Court held that public school 
students do not shed their freedom of speech at the 
“schoolhouse gate,” 393 U.S. at 506, and their expression 
may not be suppressed unless, to repeat, school officials 
reasonably conclude that it will “materially and substantially 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school,” id. at 513.  Our 
Court in two en banc rulings expressly declined to hold that 
Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech and applied 
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Tinker’s reasoning to those cases.  See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 
219 (“We need not now define the precise parameters of 
when the arm of authority can reach beyond the schoolhouse 
gate because . . . the district court found that [the student’s] 
conduct did not disrupt the school.”); id. at 220 (Jordan, J., 
concurring) (stating that the majority did not decide whether 
Tinker applies off campus and arguing that it does); J.S., 650 
F.3d at 928–31, 933 (assuming Tinker governs and applying 
it; “[n]either the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever 
allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech that 
is not school-sponsored or at a school-sponsored event and 
that caused no substantial disruption at school”).  In both en 
banc cases we held in favor of students who had been 
suspended from school, and disciplined in other ways, for 
creating websites, while not on school property and not using 
school computers, mocking in appalling terms school 
officials.  We concluded that the schools could not “punish a 
student for expressive conduct that originated outside of the 
schoolhouse, did not disturb the school environment and was 
not related to any school sponsored event.”  Layshock, 650 
F.3d at 207.  
B.L. concedes we need not decide whether Tinker’s 
test applies off campus.  See, e.g., Appellee’s Br. 22 (“It is an 
open question whether public schools can ever punish 
students’ out-of-school speech—even if the Tinker standard is 
satisfied. . . .  The Court need not answer that question in this 
case.”).  Nonetheless, my colleagues in the majority hold that 
“Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech—that is, speech 
that is outside school-owned, -operated, or -supervised 
channels and that is not reasonably interpreted as bearing the 
school’s imprimatur[,]” Maj. Op. 33, and leave open the door 
for schools to regulate off-campus student speech if it 
threatens violence or harasses particular students or teachers, 
id. at 37.  However, the case before us does not involve 
“school-supervised channels,” nor does it concern speech that 
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carried the school imprimatur, or was violent or threatening.  
So it comes as no surprise that the majority does not give 
guidance on how its new rule is to be applied.  How do we 
define school-supervised channels?  Do these channels 
include all forms of social media students use that schools 
monitor?  What type of speech constitutes “harassment” in 
the school and social media context?  Indeed there are no 
facts before us to draw a clear and administrable line for this 
new rule that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech.  
The case before us is straightforward—B.L.’s Snap is 
not close to the line of student speech that schools may 
regulate.  B.L. was suspended from her school’s cheerleading 
team as punishment for a Snap that said “fuck cheer,” which 
she created on her own smartphone, on her own time on a 
weekend, while off-campus, and not participating in any 
school-sponsored activity.  The Snap did not mention the 
School District, the school, or any individuals, and did not 
feature any team uniforms, school logos, or school property.  
It caused complaints by a few other cheerleaders but no 
“substantial disruptions,” and the coaches testified that they 
did not expect the Snap would substantially disrupt any 
activities in the future.1   
 
1 My colleagues cite Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 
584 (6th Cir. 2007), and Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. 
Marshalltown School District, 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001), 
among other cases, to argue that B.L.’s case is actually a 
nuanced one because it involves student athletics.  However, 
both Lowery, 497 F.3d at 593–94, and Wildman, 249 F.3d at 
771, expressly applied Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test 
and considered the effect of the students’ speech on team 
morale in deciding whether it caused a disruption.  In my 
view, there is nothing controversial about the notion that 
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We have already rejected the School District’s 
principal argument, specifically that Bethel School District 
Number 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), allows schools 
to punish students for their offensive or profane speech when 
the speech takes place off campus, outside of school 
activities, and without the use of school resources.  J.S., 650 
F.3d at 920, 923, 925, 932–33 & n.12; Layshock, 650 F.3d at 
209, 219.  And none of the other narrow exceptions to Tinker 
apply.  B.L.’s Snap did not bear the imprimatur of the school 
in the way a school-sponsored newspaper does, see 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 
(1988), and she did not send her Snap from a school-
supervised or -sanctioned event nor to anyone at such an 
event, see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007).   
My colleagues correctly point out that the School 
District’s remaining arguments also are unavailing.  That 
students have a reduced expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment when they participate in extracurricular 
athletics, see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
657, 661–62, 665 (1995), has no bearing on our First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  We have never and decline now 
to “graft an extracurricular distinction onto our [First 
Amendment] case law.”  Maj. Op. 18.  I agree.  Nor am I 
aware of any other circuit court that has adopted such a 
distinction. 
 
courts may consider all the ways in which student speech may 
be disruptive, including its effect on student activities such as 
sports and sportsmanship.  That is indeed what the District 
Court did here; it considered all the alleged disruptive effects 
of B.L.’s speech and concluded that 
under Tinker, J.S., and Layshock, B.L.’s speech was not 
disruptive.  I agree with the District Court and would affirm 
on the same ground. 
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Thus Tinker and its progeny, and our en banc decisions 
in Layshock and J.S., dictate that the School District violated 
B.L.’s First Amendment rights.  That is all we had to say.  
Instead, ours is the first Circuit Court to hold that 
Tinker categorically does not apply to off-campus speech.  A 
few Circuits have flirted with such a holding and have 
declined to apply Tinker to off-campus speech on a case-by-
case basis.  See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 
F.3d 608, 615, 619–20 (5th Cir. 2004) (declining to apply 
Tinker where student at home drew a picture of school being 
attacked, and that picture inadvertently ended up on campus, 
because it was off-campus speech not directed at the school 
and the student took no step to bring the speech on campus); 
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that school violated students’ speech rights by 
suspending them for publishing an underground lewd 
newspaper that was printed and distributed off campus, even 
if an occasional article was composed on campus, because the 
newspaper was “off-campus expression”).  However, those 
same Circuit Courts have subsequently applied Tinker to off-
campus speech.  See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 
2007) (applying Tinker to uphold punishment of student who 
sent instant messages to fellow students from home computer 
during non-school hours depicting teacher being shot because 
the student’s hostile off-campus speech posed a reasonably 
foreseeable threat of disruption in school); Bell v. Itawamba 
Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (declining to 
“adopt any rigid standard,” but applying Tinker to a student 
who posted off site a song recording that threatened and 
harassed two teachers); see also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 
F.3d 41, 50–53 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying Tinker to uphold 
punishment of student whose blog demeaned school 
administrators for cancelling a school concert, and clarifying 
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that Thomas v. Board of Education did not stand for the 
proposition that off-campus speech may never be punished).   
The bottom line is that Circuit Courts facing harder 
and closer calls have stayed their hand and declined to rule 
categorically that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech.  
Yet we do so here in a case bereft of substantial disruptions 
within the school.  I fear that our decision will sow further 
confusion.  For example, how does our holding apply to off-
campus racially tinged student speech?  Can a school 
discipline a student who posts off-campus Snaps reenacting 
and mocking the victims of police violence where those 
Snaps are not related to school, not taken or posted on 
campus, do not overtly threaten violence and do not target 
any specific individual, yet provoke significant disruptions 
within the school?  Hard to tell.  We promulgate a new 
constitutional rule based on facts that do not require us to 
entertain hard questions such as these.  
The craft of judging has a restraining principle: Do not 
decide today what can be decided tomorrow, for tomorrow it 
may not need to be decided.  We twist that tenet today by a 
wide-reaching holding for facts outside the question my 
colleagues call.  In J.S., despite a well-reasoned concurrence 
urging that Tinker not apply to off-campus student speech, 
J.S., 650 F.3d at 936–41 (Smith, J.), our en banc decisions in 
both it and Layshock declined to go that far.  Yet a panel does 
so today with no more compelling context than either en banc 
case.  Our task is to balance tolerance for expressive conduct 
with the need for order in our schools.  The test in Tinker—
whether student speech reasonably “forecast[s] substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities,” 
393 U.S. at 514—is the law we applied en banc, and it no 
doubt works here to rule in B.L.’s favor.  Why go further until 
it is needed?  
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Hence, while I join the judgment in today’s case, I 
dissent from its holding.  
